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Commerce Clause Limitations on State Regulation
and Taxation of the Energy Industry
Edward A. Tanzman*
INTRODUCTION

Limitations on state power over the energy industry embodied in
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution are becoming increasingly important as states begin to assert themselves in
an area that long has been controlled primarily by the federal government. This development necessitates a review of selected major
United States Supreme Court decisions which have considered
challenges to state energy regulatory and tax measures on commerce clause grounds, in order to evaluate the extent to which the
Court will allow similar state laws in future cases.
It is evident that a wave of federal energy regulation has crested
and is, at least for the present, receding. During the Carter Administration, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 19781 was enacted, which
has as a primary goal the elimination of federal price controls on
much natural gas in interstate commerce.' The Reagan Adminis* B.A., University of Chicago, 1973; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1976, Policy
Analyst, Energy and Environmental Systems Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily
those of Argonne National Laboratory or its sponsors. The author wishes to thank Ellen L.
Partridge and Barry Kellman for their many contributions to this effort.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
2. A partial listing of federal energy statutes enacted since the oil embargo of 1973 includes: the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980); the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-798 (1976 & Supp. IV. 1980); the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); the Energy Conservation and Production Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980); the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (Supp. IV 1980); the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp. IV 1980); the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. III 1979); the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980); the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8278 (Supp. III 1979); the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92
Stat. 3174 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5594 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979); the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8541 (Supp.
III 1979); the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4986-4998 (West
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tration energy policymakers are deeply committed to reducing the
federal presence in energy production and consumption$ and already have permitted the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973 (EPAA), which imposed federal ceiling prices on domestic
crude oil sales, to expire.4
Similarly, the federal government is taxing energy businesses
less. For example, section 602 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981' reduces the tax created by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 19806 on "newly-discovered oil" from thirty percent of
the so-called "windfall profit"7 to fifteen percent by 1986.0 Since
federal taxation of a commodity does not preempt a state from imposing its own tax,9 tax rate reduction does not have the same effect on state authority as repeal of a federal regulatory statute.
However, a reduction in federal energy tax rates does imply that
more profits will be available for state taxation.
As the federal government reduces its role in managing the energy industry, state governments apparently are acting to replace
some of the federal energy laws with their own. The Library of
Congress Congressional Research Service recently suggested that
the expiration of the EPAA "marks a point where state regulation
may be expanded for purposes of providing tax revenue, carrying
on production, conservation, and other forms of regulation which
may have formerly conflicted with EPAA."' 0 Indeed, some federal

1980); and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Amendments Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 62016422 (West Supp. 1981).
3. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Energy, Securing America's Energy Future: The National Energy Policy Plan 2 (DOE/S-0008) (July 1981) [hereinafter .cited as Securing
America's Energy Future], which states that:
Increased reliance on market decisions offers a continuing national referendum
which is a far better means of charting the Nation's energy path than stubborn
reliance on government dictates or on a combination of subsidies and regulations ....
This approach represents a radical departure from the prevailing policy instituted after the first shock of rapid oil price increases in 1973 and 1974.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 760g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See infra note 61.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 337-38 (August 13, 1981).
6. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4986-4998 (West 1980).
7. Id. § 4988(a).
8. Id. § 4987(b), as amended by § 602 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 337-38.
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 198-99 (1824).
10. R. Poling, Legal Effect of the Expiration of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act: Termination of Federal Statutory Pre-emption of State Law, Library of Congress
Congressional Research Service (May 14, 1981), reprinted in Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1981) .(statement of Sen. Ford) [hereinafter cited as Poling]. See Office of State Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Report On State Legislation - Special
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officials seem to be encouraging states in this direction."
A general withdrawal of the federal government from energy regulation and taxation does not, of course, leave the field totally
open to state lawmakers. Restraints grounded in the- commerce
clause will continue to limit state action even where no federal
statute exists to preempt the state laws. The nature and extent of
these restrictions can be expected to shape the kinds of state energy laws which emerge.
State lawmakers who look to Supreme Court decisions for guidance on the commerce clause limitations on their power to pass
energy laws may become frustrated in their attempt to discover
standards. The spate of federal energy regulatory statutes beginning in the New Deal preempted so much of the field that the only
decisions bearing directly on many important questions about state
power under the commerce clause are over a half-century old.
Other decisions, notably concerning state taxation of energy firms,
are so recent that their implications have not yet been realized.
This article will separate its consideration of commerce clause
limitations on state power over the interstate energy industry into
discussions of regulation and taxation.12 First, a brief discussion of
the historical origins of commerce clause restrictions of state power
will be presented. Second, commerce clause limitations on state
regulation of the energy industry will be examined. Third, commerce clause restrictions on state taxation of the energy industry
will be considered. Finally, this article will conclude by asserting

Edition - State Laws: Radioactive Waste Disposal and Management (December 1981),
which contains a summary of some 84 state laws and resolutions enacted between March
1975 and October 1981 regarding radioactive waste.
11. See Securing America's Energy Future, supra note 3, where it is stated that: "The
challenge ahead is to provide a healthy economy and policy environment that enables citizens, businesses, and state and local governments to make rational energy production and
" Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
consumption decisions ..
Commissioner Peter Bradford of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) suggested in a recent speech that:
at a time in which both Congress and the Administration seem inclined to treat
. . . the NRC regulatory process . . . as little more than a nuisance, it is vitally
important that the states in which reactors exist or are being built or may in the
future be sited be prepared to play an effective and constructive role in their
oversight.
P. Bradford, "Emerging Federal Nuclear Policy and Its Effect On Safety In The States,"
remarks delivered to the Eastern Association of Attorneys General (October 19, 1981)
(Speech No. S-3-81), reprinted in 7 Nuclear Regulatory News Releases No. 39 at 5 (October
27, 1981).
12. The distinction in commerce clause analysis between state regulatory laws and tax
laws was first made in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824).
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that present Supreme Court doctrine allows states greater latitude
in regulating and taxing the energy industry than in the past.
ORIGINS- OF COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRICTION OF STATE POWER

The commerce clause, which states that "[tihe Congress shall
have power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States. . .,,"'I carves out an area of policymaking which is reserved
to the federal government and denied to state governments. This
reserved area results from Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the commerce clause as creating two distinct limits on state power.
First, the commerce clause grants to the federal government authority to preempt conflicting state laws by enacting statutes regulating interstate commerce. 4 Second, the commerce clause acts as
an independent restriction on state power over interstate commerce, 16 even where no federal statute exists. Since the current
trend is toward federal withdrawal from managing the energy industry, this article will consider only independent restrictions imposed by the commerce clause on state authority to regulate and
tax this industry."6
Cooley v. Board of Wardens17 is the first Supreme Court decision explicitly establishing that the commerce clause, by its own
terms, can prohibit states from governing interstate trade even if
the federal government has not preempted them."8 This case is significant not only for its precedential value, but also because its

13. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.3.
14. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-31 (1947).
15. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944).
16. For analyses of the preemptive authority of the federal government to pass statutes
governing the energy industry, see, e.g., White & Barry, Energy Development In the West:
Conflict and Coordination of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1976);
Engdahl, Some Observations On State and Federal Control of NaturalResources, 15 Hous.
L. REV. 1201 (1978).
17. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
18. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as Dowling]. See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
440 (1978). Two commerce clause cases that preceded Cooley indicate the historical antecedents of the dispute it tried to resolve. See Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Blackbird Creek,
the Court held that Delaware could authorize construction of a dam across a navigable
stream, provided that the federal government had not enacted a statute regulating the area,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 249. In Brown, on the other hand, the Court held that Maryland could
not require a fifty dollar license as a condition of selling imported goods at retail, even
though no federal statute apparently existed. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 459. See generally P.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:13 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as P. HARTMAN] for a discussion of early commerce clause decisions.
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three opinions delineate the basic ongoing tensions inherent in
commerce clause analysis.
In Cooley, one question faced by the Court was whether a Pennsylvania statute imposing a penalty on ships entering or leaving
the Port of Philadelphia without a pilot was contrary to the commerce clause.' 9 Having established that the statute in question was
a regulation of interstate commerce, 0 the Court held that the statute was not an unconstitutional invasion of the grant of authority
given to the federal government by the commerce clause. The majority, speaking through Justice Curtis, reasoned that although the
commerce clause prohibited certain state actions even where no
federal statute existed, it was not an exclusive grant of authority to
the federal government in all areas. The Court concluded that:
the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in
their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule,
operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every
port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively
demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this
power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of
the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning
all of them, what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots
and pilotage is plain. 2 '
The majority interpreted the commerce clause to require the Court
to examine the area of interstate commerce which a state seeks to
regulate and, in the absence of a contrary federal law, to uphold
the state law unless that area of commerce required a uniform national regulatory system. Thus, the Court in Cooley rejected the

19. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 311-12, 315. Other constitutional challenges to the statute included allegations that the statute violated the restrictions in art. I, § 10, cl. 2 on state
imposts or duties, that it contravened the requirement embodied in art. I, § 8, cl. 1 that all
duties, imposts, and excises be uniform, and that it operated in violation of art. I, § 9, cl. 6
as a preference to the ports of one state over another. Id. at 313-14. Each of these contentions was rejected by the Court.
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id. at 319.
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notion that states never could regulate interstate commerce and
prescribed the first test for determining when such regulation was
appropriate.
Justice Daniel, who concurred in the result,22 took a different approach. He apparently accepted the majority's interpretation of
the federal commerce power,2 3 but concluded that the Pennsylvania statute did not regulate interstate commerce, and thus, could
not contravene the commerce clause.2 4
Justice McLean's dissent reveals a more literal view than that of
the majority. Agreeing with the majority that the Pennsylvania piloting statute regulated interstate commerce, 25 Justice McLean
reasoned that this finding placed the activity of piloting outside
the scope of state sovereignty.2 6 Reminding the majority of the
abuses which led to the inclusion of the commerce clause in the
Constitution,2 7 he raised the specter that "the principle of this
case, if carried out, will deeply affect the commercial prosperity of
the country . . . [A] conflict similar to that which existed before

22. Id. at 325-26 (Daniel, J., concurring). It is not clear how far this acceptance went.
Although Justice Daniel disagreed with Justice McLean that the potential for state abuse of
interstate commerce was enough to invalidate its regulation by states, id. at 326 (Daniel, J.,
concurring), his statement that the "power of commercial regulation vested by the Constitution in Congress, and which by the Constitution must, when exercised by Congress, be enforced with perfect equality .... " id. at 325 (Daniel, J., concurring) (emphasis added), suggests that he would have required a federal statute to preempt state regulation of interstate
commerce, and would not have held that the commerce clause, by its own force, could accomplish this result.
23. Id. at 325 (Daniel, J., concurring).
24. Id. (Daniel, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 322-23 (McLean, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 323 (McLean, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 324 (McLean, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Marshall, writing in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), summarized the experience under the Articles of
Confederation as follows:
The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption of the
constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign nations with a
single view to their own interests; and our disunited efforts to counteract their
restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed,
possessed the power of making treaties; but the inability of the federal government to enforce them had become so apparent as to render that power in a great
degree useless. Those who felt the injury arising from this state of things, and
those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity
of nations, perceived the necessity of giving control over this important subject to
a single government. It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from
the feebleness of the federal government, contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present system, than the deep and general conviction,
that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress.
Id. at 445-46.
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the adopting of the Constitution [will arise]. The States favorably
situated . . . may levy a contribution upon the commerce of other
states .. "28 Justice McLean would have held that any state attempt at exercising
authority over interstate commerce was
29
unconstitutional.
These three views-the so-called "concurrent theory," that the
commerce clause prohibits some but not all state exercises of
power over interstate commerce, 0 the "exclusive theory," that the
commerce clause prohibits all such assertions of authority," and
that regardless of what the commerce clause prohibits, the real
question is what interstate commerce encompasses-are a recurring theme in subsequent opinions. As the makeup of the Supreme
Court has shifted, so has the popularity of any one of these various
approaches.3 2 It is crucial to an understanding of state power over
the energy industry to determine both which view of this question
the Court may have taken in deciding landmark energy cases from
Cooley to the present, and to what extent this view has retained its
vitality.
COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF THE

ENERGY INDUSTRY

Precedent must be approached with caution in seeking to understand how the commerce clause limitations announced in Cooley
affect modern state regulation of the energy industry in the absence of preemptive federal law. The reason for this prudence is
that a number of landmark decisions in this area occurred early in
this century, a-period when the Court had become more suspicious
of state regulation of interstate commerce than at the time of Cooley."3 Consequently, several state statutes which were passed to

28. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 324-25 (McLean, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 325 (McLean, J., dissenting).
30. Scholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CH. L. REv. 556,
559, 576-77 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Scholley].
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1978), stating
that "the Court has employed various tests to express the distinction between permissible
and impermissible impact upon interstate commerce [by state statutes,] but experience
teaches that no single conceptual approach identifies all of the factors that may bear, on a
particular case." (footnotes omitted).
33. Professor Scholley suggested that this "revolutionary" change originated with the
State Freight Tax Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 276-77 (1873). Scholley, supra note 30, at
580-81. By the time of Wabash, St. Louis & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), the
change had been recognized openly by the Court. Id. at 580-81 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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control the then-burgeoning natural gas and electricity industries 4
were held to violate commerce clause restrictions.
Modern commerce clause analysis by the Court is more reminiscent of the tolerant attitude of Cooley toward state regulation of
interstate commerce than of the hostile view suggested by the early
energy regulation cases.38 Nonetheless, some of these early cases
never have been overruled, probably because passage of such New
Deal federal statutes as the Federal Power Act of 193536 and the
Natural Gas Act of 193837 preempted the field and made state regulation of much of the energy industry irrelevant. As the federal
government reduces its energy regulation, these precedents may
again be invoked as increasing state regulation of the energy industry generates new litigation. 8 A re-examination of the reasoning
which determined these early decisions in light of more recent
cases is necessary to understand the extent to which the principles
they announced still are valid.
This section will compare one early Supreme Court decision with
one modern decision in each of three selected regulatory areas, in
order to illustrate the extent to which the commerce clause analysis in the original, landmark cases retain their vitality. The three
regulatory areas selected for analysis are energy price regulation,
structure of energy companies, and reservation of scarce energy
supplies for state residents. These are obvious areas which a state
might choose to regulate today, and appropriate cases on these
subjects are available for comparison. This section will demonstrate that the older Supreme Court case in each regulatory category was premised on an interpretation of the commerce clause

34. DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 30, 32 (1945).
35. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), for the Court's most frequently cited recent formulation of its standard.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§791-828c (1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. This may already be taking place in energy taxation. The Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), noted that "[tihe effect of the commerce clause
on state taxation of interstate commerce is a frequently litigated subject that appears to be
undergoing a revival of sorts." Id. at 443. This case is considered in detail at text accompanying notes 144-54 infra. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.Ct. 2946 (1981),
where the Court disapproved Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922), and held
that a state severence tax is not immunized from commerce clause scrutiny by a claim that
the tax is imposed on the goods prior to their entry into the stream of commerce. 100 S.Ct.
at 2952-53. Commonwealth Edison is considered in detail at text accompanying notes 11427 infra. As a result of such recent decisions, commerce clause limitations on state energy
taxation are considerably clearer.
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that the Court rejected in Cooley and probably would reject again
today. As a result, state energy price regulation laws which once
were invalidated might be sustained today. In addition, the scope
of state authority to determine the structure of energy firms has
been expanded. Nevertheless, protectionist state laws reserving
scarce energy supplies for state residents seem no more likely to
pass constitutional muster than in the past.
Energy Price Regulation
Perhaps because the distribution of some forms of energy is a
natural monopoly function,3 9 states frequently have attempted to
impose controls on its wholesale or retail price.40 In Missouri v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 41 the Court confronted the question of
whether the commerce clause prevented Missouri and Kansas from
imposing a ceiling on the price of natural gas sold wholesale to local distributing companies in those states for later resale to consumers. 42 Kansas Natural Gas Co. purchased natural gas in
Oklahoma, transported it into Missouri and Kansas, and sold it to
local distributing companies there for resale.43 In both states, the
Utilities Commissions had set a maximum price of thirty-five cents

39. Professor Kellman explains that "[a] natural monoply endeavor is an activity that
can be accomplished more efficiently by one entity than by several entities.
... and that
energy distribution frequently is a natural monopoly. Kellman, De-Utilizing the Energy Industry: Planning the Solar Transition, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 15 (1980).
40. Professor Kellman adds that:
Essentially, regulation is a contract between the natural monopolist and the populace. The reason for entering this contract is as follows: while competition would
force a lower price and higher ouput than regulation, regulation stabilizes the market and protects against the abuse of monopoly power. The natural monopolist
would like to have a guarantee of "no competition," enforced by the state. With
such a guarantee, it could charge a monopoly price for its highly prized good,
overcharging customers who are willing to pay and failing to serve those who cannot pay. Since the populace does not want this sort of "regulation," a compromise
much like a contract is reached. In consideration of state protection from competition, the natural monopolist agrees to charge only enough to allow him a reasonable return on his investment.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
41. 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
42. Id. at 305. A closely-related question, not at issue in Kansas Natural Gas, was
whether the state could regulate the price of natural gas sold at retail from a distributor to
consumers. This question was considered in Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236
(1919), where the Court held that natural gas sales originating from the same company involved in the Kansas Natural Gas litigation, but between distributors and consumers, were
not in interstate commerce and therefore were subject to price controls set by the Commission. Id. at 245.
43. 265 U.S. at 305.
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per thousand cubic feet (mcf) for these sales." Kansas Natural Gas
Co. unilaterally raised its price to forty cents per mcf, and officials
of both states brought suit in three different courts seeking to rescind the price hike." In two of the cases, the injunction sought
against the higher prices was denied, whereas in the third, a writ of
mandamus to compel a price reduction was granted."
The Supreme Court affirmed the two courts which had refused
to prevent the price increase and reversed the court which had acted to stop the hike. 7 In a discussion more reminiscent of Justice
McLean's Cooley dissent than of the concurrent theory embraced
by the Cooley majority, the Court declared that "the commerce
clause of the Constitution, of its own force, restrains the States
from imposing direct burdens upon interstate commerce.

.

. [The]

silence [of Congress], where it has the sole power to speak, is
equivalent to a declaration that that particular commerce shall be
free from regulation."48 Thus, the commerce clause was held to
preempt any state regulation of goods in interstate commerce.49
44. Id.
45. Id. at 305-06.
46. Central Trust Co. v. Consumers' Light, Heat & Power Co., 282 F. 680 (D. Kan. 1922);
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 282 F. 341 (W.D. Mo. 1922); State v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 111 Kan. 809, 208 P. 622 (1922).
47. 265 U.S. at 310.
48. Id. at 307-08. The use of the phrase "direct burdens upon interstate commerce" in
this opinion has its own history and contributes to the confusioin associated with understanding commerce clause restrictions on state regulatory authority. Professor Scholley asserted that the so-called direct/indirect burden doctrine first was used in the Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 396 (1913) and was regarded as the "equivalent" of the Cooley
doctrine. Scholley, supra note 30, at 589. Unfortunately, later opinions were not consistent
with this formulation and the distinction became a mere label for outcomes, "since it offered
so little of a criterion for determining on which side a case would fall." Dowling, supra note
17, at 6 (citing DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927)) (Stone, J., dissenting).
Professor Hartman suggests that a review of decisions employing the direct/indirect criteria reveals that the Court felt that any state regulation or taxation of interstate commerce
contravened the commerce clause. Cases where a state law was invalidated because it was
held to directly burden interstate commerce were those where the state regulated interstate
commerce, whereas those in which the state law was upheld because it only indirectly burdened interstate commerce were situations where the state law only regulated intrastate
commerce. P. HARTMAN, supra note 18, at § 2:13. In effect, the direct/indirect burden doctrine simply became another formulation of the "exclusive theory". See text accompanying
note 30 supra.
49. A contemporary commerce clause challenge to a federal energy price control statute
met similar success, although for opposite reasons to those in Kansas Natural Gas. In
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court held that a federal statute regulating the coal industry and authorizing price controls violated the commerce clause because
coal mining was an activity in intrastate commerce and, therefore, not a valid subject for
federal regulation. Id. at 304-17.
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The only relevant inquiry, according to this view, is whether a particular commodity which a state seeks to regulate is actually in interstate commerce.5 0 In Kansas Natural Gas, the Court had little
difficulty concluding that the natural gas sales in question were in
interstate commerce, thereby automatically invalidating the state
attempts at price control.5 '
In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,52 decided
some twenty-six years after Kansas Natural Gas, the Court
adopted an approach to state regulation of energy prices which
suggests that it had returned to the views of the majority in Cooley. In Peerless, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission had directed Cities Service, owner of certain substantial production wells
and one of the only pipelines which could transport natural gas
from the wells to market, to take gas ratably from Peerless' wells
in the same field5 and set a minimum price of seven cents per mcf
for gas sold from the field. 4 Some ninety percent of the production
50. The logical conclusion of this approach is that natural gas sold at retail is in intrastate commerce and subject to state price control regulation, whereas wholesale sales between pipeline companies and distributors are in interstate commerce and immune from
state price regulation. See note 42 supra. Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion the Court
reached in Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942). The
Court traced its decisions in the area of natural gas price regulation and also points out that
another early line of cases used a less "mechanical" approach, id. at 505-06, similar to the
approach the Court would later apply in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,
340 U.S. 179 (1980). The Court in Illinois Natural Gas found it unnecessary to resolve the
dilemma created by the conflicting approaches, however, because it held that the Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), preempted states from any
regulatory authority they might otherwise have had over wholesale sales of natural gas. 314
U.S. at 506. Peerless is discussed in detail at text accompanying notes 52-63 infra.
51. 265 U.S. at 308; accord, Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927) (electricity sold across state lines).
Passage of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976 & Supp. IV 1980),
was a direct result of the decisions in Kansas Natural Gas and Attleboro. Both the Senate
and the House of Representatives reports on the bills which later became the Natural Gas
Act noted these two cases and stated, in identical language, that "[tihe basic purpose of the
present legislation is to occupy this field in which the Supreme Court has held that the
States may not act." S. REP. No. 1162, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 79, 75th
Cong., 1st Seass. 2 (1937).
52. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
53. "Ratable taking" is defined as the "production of oil and/or gas in such quantities
that each landowner whose tract overlies a producing formation will be able to recover a fair
share of the oil and/or gas originally in place beneath his land." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW: MANUAL

OF OIL AND GAS TERMS

615-16 (1981). In Peerless, the

Oklahoma Corporation Commission prescribed a formula for calculating the share Cities
Service was required to purchase from Peerless. 340 U.S. at 183.
54. 340 U.S. at 181-83. Thus, the effect of the Commission order was to require Cities
Service to purchase a specified quantity of natural gas from Peerless at not less than a
minimum price. The dispute underlying this case resulted from Cities Service's apparent
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from the field ultimately was consumed outside of Oklahoma."
Cities Service appealed the orders to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, alleging that the two orders violated the commerce clause."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the Commission. a7
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Oklahoma Supreme Court.'5 Unlike the approach it had taken in Kansas Natural Gas, the Court in Peerless did not view the commerce clause as
an exclusive delegation to Congress of authority over interstate
commerce. Reflecting a revival of the majority view in Cooley that
states may regulate interstate commerce under certain circumstances, the Court explained that:
a state may regulate matters of local concern over which federal
authority has not been exercised, even though the regulation has
some impact on interstate commerce. The only requirements consistently recognized have been that the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it
safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at
stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the
prevention of state restrictions."
Thus, the Court expressed its willingness to look at the effects on
interstate commerce of a state law in order to evaluate the extent
of the state's justification. Because it found a state interest in

attempt to use its ownership of an interstate natural gas pipeline to take advantage of Peerless and other non-integrated producers in the same natural gas field. Cities Service owned a
substantial number of wells in the field, as well as a pipeline to transport the natural gas
produced there to market. Id. at 181-82. The effect of Cities Service's rapid production was
to deplete not only its own wells, but, due to loss of pressure throughout the field, those of
Peerless. Id. at 182. This left Peerless with the disagreeable choice of producing natural gas
which it had no means of transporting to market, or losing the natural gas altogether. Id. As
a result, Peerless offered to sell its potential output to Cities Service, which offered only four
cents per mcf and conditioned the contract on other unfavorable terms. Id. Peerless then
turned to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for relief. Id.
55. Id. at 181.
56. Id. at 183-84.
57. 203 Okla. 35, 220 P.2d 279 (1950).
58. 340 U.S. at 189.
59. Id. at 186-87.
60. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), the Court applied
this test to determine whether a 1977 Minnesota statute banning retail milk sales in nonreturnable plastic containers, but permitting use of non-returnables made of paper, contravened the commerce clause. Id. at 459. Rejecting the argument that the statute discriminated in favor of Minnesota pulpwood manufacturers, who make paper milk containers, and
against out-of-state plastic resin manufacturers, the Court weighed the burden the law imposed on interstate commerce against its local benefits. Id. at 472. Finding little adverse
effect on dairy container manufacturers as a practical matter, id. at 472-73, the Court found
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"preventing rapid and uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief
natural resources" and no clear national interest to the contrary, 6'
the Court concluded that the Commission's orders did not contravene the commerce clause."2
The change in approach to commerce clause restrictions on state
energy price regulation illustrated by these two cases suggests that
the Court might approve a modern state law imposing the wholesale price controls which were struck down in Kansas Natural Gas.
Of course, the outcome of such a case would turn on the extent to
which the particular statute being reviewed meets the Peerless balancing test. Nevertheless, the fact that the analysis which determined the outcome in Kansas Natural Gas has been discredited
signifies that some circumstances might justify state regulation of
wholesale energy prices. The recent federal price decontrol of both
crude oil and certain categories of natural gas leaves the way open
for states to enact such statutes."'
an overriding local justification in the statute's stated purpose of "promoting conservation
of energy and other natural resources and easing solid waste disposal problems.
Id. at
473.
61. Prophetically, the Court pointed out that "strong arguments have been made that
the national interest lies in preserving this limited resource for domestic and industrial uses
for which natural gas has no completely satisfactory substitute" even though the Court recognized that its decision would raise natural gas prices. 340 U.S. at 187.
62. 340 U.S. at 187-88. It is important to note that the Court in Peerless emphasized
that it did not consider potential conflict between the Oklahoma orders and the Natural Gas
Act of 1938. The Court expressly reserved the question of whether state authority in this
area might be preempted by the Act. Id. at 188-89. In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America
v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955) (per curiam), the Court considered this question and
held that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 preempted Oklahoma's power to set minimum natural gas prices for sales into interstate commerce. Id. at 45. But see Federal Power Comm'n v.
Corporation Comm'n, 362 F. Supp. 522, 535 (W.D. Okla. 1973), which questions in dicta
whether Peerless still is good law on its facts.
63. See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra. Whether the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980), in fact constitutes a federal withdrawal from
natural gas price control is by no means clear. Although section 602(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3432(a) (Supp. IV 1980), states that "[niothing in this Chapter shall affect the authority of
any State to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for the first sale of natural gas
produced in such State which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any,
under Subchapter I of this Chapter" (emphasis added), the impact of the Act on the authority of natural gas consuming states is not addressed specifically. It would indeed be ironic
for the court to construe uncertainty in this statute against state power to regulate wholesale natural gas prices, since the express reason for creation of the scheme of federal natural
gas price regulation was the court's own refusal on now discredited grounds to permit states
to do so.
State power to regulate crude oil and refined petroleum product prices is less ambiguous.
S.1503, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives but was vetoed by the President, contained provisions which mandated unregulated oil prices except during specified emergencies upon Presidential declaration, and ex-
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Restrictions on Structure of Energy Companies
Two cases involving state restrictions on the kinds of energy
companies which may do business within state borders illustrate a
similar evolution in commerce clause doctrine and a corresponding
liberalization in the kinds of state laws that will be upheld. West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co." presented the question of whether the
commerce clause prohibited Oklahoma from banning any corporations not chartered in the state from transporting natural gas produced there.6 5 In 1907, Oklahoma enacted a statute which created
a number of restrictions on natural gas transmission companies,
ostensibly to promote conservation of the resource.6 One of these
provisions excluded non-Oklahoma corporations from constructing
natural gas pipelines in the state. 7 Kansas Natural Gas Co., a Delaware corporation, and three other citizens of West Virginia, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania owning various rights to natural gas in
Oklahoma, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of this
law on the grounds that it violated the commerce clause.6 8 The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined further enforcement of the Oklahoma statute.6 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court.7 0 Echoing the
values of Justice McLean's dissent in Cooley pronounced sixty
years earlier, the Court asserted that "the right to engage in interstate commerce is not the gift of a State, and. . . cannot be regulated or restrained by a State. ' ' 71 Rejecting the state's contention
that its law was a conservation statute and, therefore, did not regulate interstate commerce; the Court held that the statute was

plicitly preempted state control over oil prices. (See S. REP. No. 97-313, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
8-9, 21-24 (1982) for the final version of the vetoed bill and the explanation of the Conference Committee of the bill's preemption provisions. The President's veto message, which
makes no mention of the preemption provisions, can be found at CONG. Rac. S2513-14 (daily
ed. March 22, 1982)). The passage of this bill by the Senate and House suggests a recognition by Congress that states have the power to regulate crude oil and refined petroleum
product prices; its veto leaves this power intact.
64. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
65. Id. at 239-40.
66. Id. at 239-43.
67. Id. at 239 n.1.
68. Id. at 241-44.
69. Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 F. 545 (E.D. Okla. 1909).
70. 221 U.S. at 262.
71. Id. at 260.
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unconstitutional.2

By 1978, the Court had returned more nearly to the majority
position in Cooley and upheld a Maryland statute in Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland7 that might have been struck down if
the reasoning in West had been followed literally. Maryland had
enacted a statute in 1977 which forbade any producer or refiner of
petroleum from operating a retail service station in Maryland and
required producers and refiners to make so-called "voluntary allowances" uniformly to all service stations within the state.7 ' Exxon and three other vertically-integrated petroleum producers and
refiners filed suit in a Maryland state court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the statute violated the commerce clause.7 5 A trial
followed in which the evidence indicated that only some five percent of the number of gasoline service stations operating in Maryland were owned by petroleum producers or refiners, no production
or refining occurred in the state, and the plaintiff companies might
withdraw from the Maryland market altogether if forced to divest
their retail stations. 76 However, no evidence indicated that the
amount of petroleum products available in Maryland would be reduced as a result of the statute." The state court invalidated the
statute, primarily on the ground that it violated substantive due
process restrictions. 78 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.7 9

The Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals,"0
noting that the burden of the divestiture statute fell equally on
interstate and intrastate businesses 1 and that the statute erected
no barriers to interstate gasoline distributors. 2 The Court declared
that:
[W]e cannot adopt appellants' novel suggestion that because the
economic market for petroleum products is nationwide, no State
has the power to regulate the retail marketing of gas ....

[Wie

do not find that the Commerce Clause, by its own force, preempts the field of retail gas marketing ....
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

In the absence of a

Id. at 261.
437 U.S. 117.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id.
Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (C.A. Md. 1977).
437 U.S. at 134.
Id. at 125-26.
Id.
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relevant congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific discrimination against, or burdening of, interstate commerce,
we cannot conclude that the States are without power to regulate
in this area.8 3
Thus, the Court in Exxon v. Maryland analyzed the effect of the
commerce clause on the Maryland statute by an approach similar
to the one used by the majority in Cooley and Peerless-and in
terms exactly opposite the language in Kansas Natural Gas.
This comparison of West and Exxon v. Maryland shows that
commerce clause interpretation has shifted in favor of greater state
authority to regulate the structure of energy companies. Although
the statute struck down in West probably would not have survived
the test announced in Exxon v. Maryland because of its obvious
discrimination against interstate commerce, the fact that Maryland's law was upheld indicates that commerce clause restrictions
now are much narrower. 4 A state law regulating the structure of
energy companies which avoids the overtly parochial features of
the statute in West would stand a good chance of being approved
by the Court.
Reserving Scarce Energy Supplies for State Residents
If the liberalization in commerce clause doctrine illustrated
above was responsible for a complete reversal in the Court's attitude toward the constitutionality of state energy price control statutes, and a less dramatic shift in its opinion of energy firm structure laws, it has stopped short of indicating broad approval of state
laws regulating the private market to reserve scarce energy supplies for state residents. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,8 5 the
State of West Virginia had enacted a statute in 1919 which limited
natural gas shipments to other states to surplus gas not needed in
83. Id. at 128-29.
84. Id. Although the analysis in Exxon v. Maryland implies that West has been
superceded, West itself has recently been cited favorably in at least two cases. Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) and City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
However, in Philadelphiav. New Jersey, West is referred to only in the context of its facts,
and not its rationale. Id. at 627. Similarly, in Hughes, the Court's reliance on West was for
its ringing rhetorical denunciation of protectionism, 441 U.S. at 329-30. The dissent in
Hughes criticized the majority's reliance on West as inapposite to the facts. Id. at 340-41
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808
(1976), where the Court inexplicably quotes with favor language from H.P. Hood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1946) that is very close to the language from West quoted in
the text accompanying note 71 supra.
85. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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West Virginia.8 6 In spite of its policy to hoard supplies for its own
citizens, West Virginia, during the previous thirty years, had encouraged efforts to develop markets in Pennsylvania and Ohio,
permitting corporations to be chartered for the purpose of exporting natural gas and granting them the right of eminent domain to
build pipelines. West Virginia benefited from these efforts by collecting substantial tax revenues as a result of the economic activity
these efforts spawned. 87 At the time of the decision, and in spite of
excess demand, West Virginia was the largest natural gas producer
in the nation," exporting some 59.2 percent of its natural gas to
serve the needs of 1.5 million Pennsylvanians and over 3.5 million
Ohioans."
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of Ohio, invoking the Court's original jurisdiction on their own behalf and as
parens patriae for their citizens, sued to enjoin West Virginia from
enforcing its 1919 statute.9 0 The basis for the action was the allegation that the law contravened the commerce clause. 9' The Court
agreed, applying virtually the same test for constitutionality as it
had in Kansas Natural Gas and West. Finding that West Virginia
had violated the commerce clause, the Court stated that:
the power to regulate interstate commerce is expressly committed
to Congress and therefore impliedly forbidden to the States....
Natural gas is a lawful article of commerce, and its transmission
from one state to another for sale and consumption in the latter
is interstate commerce. . . .[The statute] is in effect an attempt
to regulate the interstate business to the advantage of the local
consumers. But this [West Virginia] may not do .... That power
is lodged elsewhere. 92
As in the other cases discussed above deciding the constitutionality
of different state energy statutes, the Court in Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia did not permit the preservation of scarce energy
supplies by a state because such regulation invaded the exclusive
prerogative of Congress, even where Congress had not acted.
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire3 is the most recent
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 596-98.
50 U.S.L.W. 4223 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982).
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analogue to Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. It reaffirms the holding of the older case, even though the Court's reasoning was considerably different. In New England Power, the Court decided
whether an order based on a 1913 New Hampshire statute violated
the commerce clause. The law permitted the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission to prohibit the export of hydroelectric
power from rivers in the state when the electricity "is reasonably
required for use within the state and the public good requires that
it be delivered for such use." ' New England Power Co., a Massachusetts corporation which sold most of its production outside
New Hampshire, owned a number of hydroelectric generating facilities in New Hampshire comprising some ten percent of its total
generating capacity."' In 1980, the New Hampshire Commission
exercised its long-dormant authority and ordered that the entire
production be sold in New Hampshire. 6 It estimated that its order
would save state residents some $25 million annually by displacing
electricity from more expensive fuels.9 '
New England Power Co., the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
and the Attorney General of Rhode Island appealed to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, arguing that the 1913 statute was preempted by the Federal Power Act of 1935 and that, as applied in
the Commission order, it violated the commerce clause. The New

94. Id. at 4224 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 374:35 (1966)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4225. The order did not require that the electricity physically be kept within
New Hampshire, but rather required a change in the system by which its cost is billed to
customers. Most utilities in New England, including New England Power Co., are members
of the New England Power Pool, which centrally dispatches electricity generated by its
member companies. Id. at 4224. The purpose of the Pool is to increase regional efficiency in
electricity generation by assuring that the least expensive available power plant always is
used to meet new demand, regardless of whether the location demanding the additional
electricity is within the service area of the company which owns the most efficient unit available at that moment with unused capacity. Id. The savings thus created are divided between
the company which owns the plant and the company which purchases the power. Id. All
members of the Pool have interconnected their generating and transmission systems so that
the flow of electricity between companies is physically uninhibited. Id. at 4225. The Commission order sought to change the way wholesale electricity costs are assessed between Pool
members, so that New Hampshire utilities, and hence their customers, were allocated the
entire savings from the New England Power Co. hydroelectric generating facilities, rather
than only a pro rata share. Id.
97. Id. at 4225. Since the actual change the order sought to accomplish was only in the
New England Power Pool billing system, one might expect a side effect to be that electricity
prices to Pool members outside New Hampshire (and their customers) would increase by
the same amount.
98. Appeal of New England Power Co., 120 N.H. 866, 424 A.2d 807 (N.H. 1980).

1982]

Energy Industry Regulation

Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Commission." Avoiding
the commerce clause question, that court held that a section of the
Federal Power Act of 1935 explicitly ratified the 1913 statute,
thereby granting authority to the Commission to issue the export
prohibition order, even though it might otherwise have transgressed the commerce clause.100
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
struck down the Commission order. 101 Disagreeing with the state
court's interpretation of the Federal Power Act of 1935, the Court
reached the question of whether the order passed commerce clause
scrutiny. 02 Although the opinion cited Pennsylvania v. West Virginia with favor,103 it did not adopt the same rigid reasoning which
so closely resembles tjie McLean dissent in Cooley. Instead of
holding that the New Hampshire order was unconstitutional
merely because it regulated interstate commerce, the Court in New
England Power stated that "the Commerce Clause. . .precludes a
State from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right
of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located
within its borders or to the products derived therefrom."'14 Thus,
the Court invalidated the order because it was overtly protectionist. What may seem at first glance to be a fine, but irrelevant, distinction becomes more important on closer examination. States
have open to them numerous methods of directing scarce energy
supplies to their citizens through regulation without explicitly denying access to out-of-state consumers.1 05 The Court in New Eng-

99. Id. at 869, 424 A.2d at 809.
100. Id. at 873-74, 876, 424 A.2d at 812, 814.
101. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4227.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 4225. The Court also favorably cited West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U.S. 229 (1911) and Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
104. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4225. Compare Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1979),
with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978), both of which are cited
by the Court. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4225-26.
105. Poling, supra note 10, at 28-89, presents a collection of state statutes which restrict
the circumstances under which gasoline franchisors may terminate their supply agreements
with franchisees. As a hypothetical example of a state law which increases energy supplies
for residents without unconstitutional protectionism, consider a statute which requires each
gasoline and home heating oil dealer to maintain a certan level of reserves over their ordinary sales as a condition for a state business license. Such a requirement would tend to
assure a larger supply of fuel than in a neighboring state without such a law, all other factors being equal. Although nothing in this hypothetical statute would prohibit those from
across the state border from purchasing fuel during a shortage from dealers with the mandated extra stocks, the expense and inconvenience of doing so would probably keep their
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land Power itself recognized that when a state goes so far as to
produce a good, it may restrict sales of that item to its residents.10
Whether the present Court would accept a state regulatory scheme
to assure energy supplies for its citizens which compromises between the extremes of outright protectionism and outright state
ownership remains to be tested.
Implications
These six decisions serve notice on states that they are now more
in control of their energy futures than they have been in the past.
The modern approach to commerce clause analysis illustrated by
Peerless, Exxon v. Maryland, and New England Power recognizes
that states have the right to regulate energy in interstate commerce in the absence of a preempting federal statute. These cases
imply that this right may outweigh contrary federal interests in
avoiding burdens on interstate commerce. An absolute prohibition
against state laws such as those struck down in Kansas Natural
Gas and West no longer applies. Instead, the Court has given way
to the more lenient commerce clause analysis which originated in
Cooley.
Nonetheless, the-comparison of Pennsylvania v. West Virginia
numbers low. Consequently, the state with such a law would succeed in using its power to
enhance energy supplies available to its residents without contravening the rule of New
England Power.
106. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4225-26 n.6. The Court rejected New Hampshire's claim that it
owned the electricity that New England Power Co. sought to export. The Court reasoned
that the Federal Power Act of 1935 had preempted whatever authority alleged state ownership of the river might otherwise have conferred over electricity generated from its waters,
and that the actual production of electricity was by a private corporation using its own
facilities. Id. In so doing, the Court acknowledged the possibility that a state could restrict
sales of a product it actually produced. Id. This exemption from ordinary commerce clause
standards is discussed extensively in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). In Reeves,
the Court resolved whether a state-owned and operated cement plant could limit sales to its
residents by upholding the restrictive sales policy. Id. at 446-47. Noting that "the Commerce
Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private
trade in the national marketplace," id. at 436-37, the Court held that the fact that the
cement plant was state-owned distinguished it from cases like Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), where the state action in question was a statute which regulated
private activities. 447 U.S. at 436-37. Where the state itself entered the market, the Court
was unwilling to conclude that its avowedly protectionist sales policies contravened the commerce clause. Id. at 440-41. Although the majority opinion specifically limited its decision to
cases where the state simply provides capital to convert freely-available raw materials into a
finished product (and explicitly excluded natural gas under the circumstances in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia where it was a scarce natural resource), id. at 443-44, the dissent read
the majority opinion as permitting a state-owned synthetic or processed energy facility to
limit the availability of its product to its residents. Id. at 453 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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with New England Power indicates that the Court is very suspicious of state laws which protect citizens by depriving out-of-state
citizens of access to resources. Although a reemergence of the majority position in Cooley is implicit in New England Power, the
state lost this case in spite of the application of a more liberal test.
A state which seeks to increase its energy supplies is likely to be
more successful at using price controls, changes in the structures of
its energy businesses, or indirect methods of directing scarce energy resources to residents as tools for change than it will be if it
engages directly in protectionism.
The exercise of state power to regulate energy where the federal
government has not enacted a contrary statute now is accorded a
significant new respect by the Court. State laws controlling wholesale prices of energy in interstate commerce will not automatically
be invalidated, and non-protectionist state regulation of the structure of energy companies doing business within their borders will
be permitted. Withdrawal by the federal government from energy
regulation does not necessarily mean a return to the absence of
regulation that stimulated some New Deal energy laws.
COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS9 ON STATE TAXATION OF THE

ENERGY INDUSTRY

Commerce clause restrictions on state taxation of the energy industry have become more defined than limitations on state energy
regulation in a series of recent decisions. The challenge these recent tax decisions present is the difficulty of reconciling them. This
section will present a comparison of these opinions and the principles of state taxation of energy in interstate commerce which they
endorse.
Pre-1977 Supreme Court analysis of the extent of state power to
tax interstate commerce was at least as confusing as its approaches
to state regulatory power.1 1 7 In spite of Cooley, many decisions evidenced a view that states simply were without power to tax any
commodity in interstate commerce.108 Instead of evaluating the importance of state taxation given the facts of a particular case, these
decisions typically turned on whether the tax in question "di-

HARTMAN, supra note 18, § 2:9.
108. Id. §2:13. See, e.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 258-59 (1922),
disapproved, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 2953 (1981). Compare
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 177-83 (1932), with Michigan-Wisconsin
Pipeline Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166-70 (1954).

107. See P.
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rectly" or "indirectly" affected interstate commerce, 10 9 the question thought most important by Justice Daniel in his concurring
opinion in Cooley. The result, according to one commentator, was
"decades of distinctions based upon insubstantial and pointless
formalism ... "110
In 1977, the Court finally admitted that the commerce clause
permits states to impose certain kinds of taxes on the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady,"' it concluded that a state tax on interstate commerce is
valid if "it is applied to, an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State. 11 2 Thus, the Court returned more closely
to the majority view in Cooley and provided clear guidance on the
commerce clause criteria by which state taxes on interstate commerce would be evaluated in the future.
Four cases decided since Complete Auto Transit have given the
Court the opportunity to apply its new test to state taxes on energy in interstate commerce. Two cases were challenges to production taxes imposed by energy-producing states, while the other two
considered the validity of income taxes imposed by energy-consuming states. Together, they provide considerable information for
determining the extent to which the Court will allow states to tax
energy.
State Taxation of Energy Production
Two 1981 cases, Commonwealth Edison, Inc. v. Montana1 3 and
1 1 4 presented
Maryland v. Louisiana,
the Court with state taxes on
energy production that were alleged to amount to an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court held that the
Montana coal severance tax passed muster under its Complete
Auto Transit test, 15 but that the Louisiana first-use tax did not. 16
These two opinions delineate the constitutional limits beyond
which state taxes on energy production cannot go.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. See note 48 supra.
Id. §2:17.
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 279.
101 S.Ct. 2946 (1981).
101 S.Ct. 2114 (1981).
101 S.Ct. at 2960.
101 S.Ct. at 2134.
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Commonwealth Edison, Inc. v. Montana
The basic constitutional question in Commonwealth Edison, Inc.
v. Montana was whether a very high state tax on energy production was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce simply because much of the coal subject to the tax was to be exported
to other states. 11 7 Montana was the location of some twenty-five
percent of the entire coal reserves in the United States, and as
much as ninety percent of its annual mined tonnage was sold to
other states.118 In 1975, Montana raised its tax on the severance of
coal from 34 cents per''19
ton to a maximum of thirty percent of the
"contract sales price.
Plaintiffs, Commonwealth Edison, Inc. and fourteen other coal
117. 101 S.Ct. at 2954. For a detailed discussion of this case, see generally Sager, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 102-12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
118. Id. at 2965 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The contract sales price is "the sales price f.o.b. mine
less any production taxes the seller passed on to the buyer." Sager, supra note 117, at 102
n.3. Montana is by no means the only state recently to have enacted high severance taxes.
Coates, "It's Economic War Among These United States", Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1981,
at 4, col. 4.
The following chart illustrates severance tax rates as of 1978 among leading energy exporting states, as well as the extent to which these taxes support their operations.
LEADING ENERGY-EXPORTING STATES' SEVERANCE TAXES

(as of 1978)

Exporting Rank

OIL TAX RATE GAS TAX RATE COAL TAX RATE

1. Louisiana

12.5%

2. Wyoming

4.0

3. New Mexico

7.0

4. kentucky

1.5

5. Alaska
6. Oklahoma
7. West Virginia
8. Montana
9. Texas

3.5%

SEVERANCE TAXES
AS % OF
STATE REVENUE

0.2%

23.55

4.0

10.5

22.81

5.8

8.4

19.16

4.5

6.96

NA

12.25

10.0

NA

19.13

7.0

7.0

0.3

17.51

4.35

8.63

3.5

13.99

2.1-2.65

2.65

30.5

11.95

4.6

7.5

NA

17.68

NA-Not available
Source: Northeast-Midwest Institute, reprinted in Coates, "It's Economic War Among
These United States," Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1981, at 4, col. 4.
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mining and utility companies, brought suit in Montana state court
seeking refunds of the new tax, which had been paid under protest,
and an injunction against its future collection. 20 They claimed
that the tax was invalid because it violated the commerce clause by
discriminating against interstate commerce and through its failure
to be fairly related to services provided by Montana. 2' 1 The trial
court rejected both claims, and the Montana Supreme Court
1 22
affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Montana Supreme Court, reasoning that the tax did not discriminate against
interstate commerce under the Complete Auto Transit test. Rejecting the companies' claim that the severance tax violated the
commerce clause because most of the tax burden was paid by outof-staters, the Court declared that "the tax burden is borne according to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any
distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers.' 2 Thus,
the Court focused only on whether the statute on its face discriminated between intrastate and interstate commerce and concluded
that it did not, because the tax rate imposed on both categories
24
was identical.
Similarly, the Court rejected the contention that the tax was not
fairly related to services provided by the state. Declining to adopt
the companies' invitation to inquire into the reasonableness of the
amount of revenues collected from interstate businesses compared
to the state services provided them, 2 5 the Court determined that
the commerce clause was satisfied if "the measure of the tax [was]

reasonably related to the extent of the contact

.126

between the

interstate business and the taxing state. Since Montana taxed coal
mining on the basis of a percentage of the coal mined, the Court
found it to be "in 'proper proportion'" to the activities of the ap27
pellants in Montana.

120. 101 S.Ct. at 2951.
121. Id. at 2954-55.
122. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 863 (Mont. 1980).
123. 101 S.Ct. at 2954-55.
124. Id. at 2955. Indeed, the Court thought this conclusion to be so obvious that it
treated the plaintiffs' claim as if it were, in fact, a variant of the second claim that the tax
was not "fairly related" to the state services it was supposed to finance. Id. at 2955-56.
125. Id. at 2959.
126. Id. at 2958 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. Undoubtedly, a strong influencing factor in this conclusion was the Court's belief that interstate businesses could constitutionally be required to pay their share of the
costs of providing them with government services, but that no formula existed to calculate
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The State of Louisiana was not as fortunate as Montana when
its first-use tax was challenged by nine states, seventeen pipeline
companies, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.'2 8
Like the coal in Montana, some ninety-eight percent of the natural
gas extracted from 948 wells off the Louisiana coast was shipped to
consumers in other states. 129 In 1978, Louisiana enacted a statute
to impose a tax of seven cents per mcf on the sale, processing,
transportation, use in manufacturing, or other action within Louisiana involving natural gas brought via gathering pipelines from
the federally-owned Outer Continental Shelf into the state.1 30 The
same Act which created the first-use tax simultaneously created
several credits and exemptions from the tax whose effect generally
was to relieve most Louisiana citizens from payment of the tax."'
Invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that the first-use tax was unconstitutional under the commerce clause because it discriminated
against interstate commerce, an injunction against future collection, and a refund of taxes already collected." 2 A special master
was appointed, who recommended that the case was appropriate
for the Court's original jurisdiction and that evidentiary hearings
should be held on the effects of the tax. 33
The Court agreed with the special master that the suit was appropriate for the exercise of its original jurisdiction, both because
the plaintiff states were themselves purchasers of natural gas subject to the tax and because they had parens patriae standing to
sue on behalf of their citizens. ' 4 The Court denied his recommendation that evidentiary hearings be conducted, however, instead
granting the plaintiffs' motions to invalidate the tax.13 5 Applying
the Complete Auto Transit test to the commerce clause claim, the
Court held that the operation of the tax together with its credits
this amount. Id. at 2955-58.
128. 101 S.Ct. at 2119. The original action was brought by eight states. The State of New
Jersey, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the pipeline companies sought intervention at a later date. Their petitions to intervene were granted in the Court's opinion
itself. Id. at 2128 n.21.
129. Id. at 2119-20.
130. Id. at 2121.
131. Id. at 2121-22.
132. Id. at 2122.
133. Id. at 2122-23.
134. Id. at 2128.
135. Id. at 2136.
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and exemptions for Louisiana citizens "unquestionably discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local interests." ' Although the Court did not conduct the factual inquiry into the economic effects of the tax which it rejected in Commonwealth
Edison, it did look beyond the specific section of law embodying
the first-use tax and considered the state's tax structure as a
37
whole.1
Commonwealth Edison and Maryland v. Louisiana neatly
bracket the power of energy-producing states to tax their resources
as they enter interstate commerce. Commonwealth Edison establishes that a severance tax imposed equally on energy sold intra
and interstate-no matter how high the rate-does not violate per
se. the commerce clause. Maryland v. Louisiana suggests that a
discriminatory scheme of taxation which imposes higher rates on
energy sold to out-of-state residents-no matter how deeply buried
the scheme is in the state's overall tax structure of taxes, credits,
and exemptions-contravenes the commerce clause.
State Taxation of Income from Energy Companies
If the Court has demonstrated a willingness to permit energyproducing states to tax their resources at non-discriminatory high
rates as they enter interstate commerce, it has shown an equally
solicitous attitude toward energy-consuming states. In Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes' 8 and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Department of Revenue 3 9 the Court upheld income taxes imposed
on energy company activities occurring outside the physical borders of the taxing states. A comparison of these two decisions
reveals how far the taxes imposed by energy consuming states can
reach. Understanding the concept of apportionment is central both to
Mobil and Exxon v. Wisconsin. The commerce clause has long
136. Id. at 2134.
137. Cf. Arthur Daniels Midland Co. v. Minnesota, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982), which
held unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds a Minnesota statute exempting from a
portion of the state's gasoline excise tax gasohol blended with alcohol distilled in Minnesota
from Minnesota agricultural products. Id. at 599. The court did not rely on Maryland v.
Louisiana or any other Supreme Court tax decision, but based its decision on Supreme
Court commerce clause cases which considered state regulatory laws. Id. at 598-99. See note
12 supra. This anomaly may have occurred because the court viewed the tax statute as a law
which "clearly thrusts the State into the role of market regulator." Id. at 600 (emphasis
added).
138. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
139. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
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been interpreted to prohibit so-called "multiple taxation", i.e., the
imposition by more than one state of the Same tax. 40 Such taxation is unconstitutional because it subjects businesses in interstate
commerce to a greater tax burden than the identical enterprise
would pay if it were only in intrastate commerce. 4" Three approaches have been developed to overcome, through approximation, the difficult problems of distinguishing which state is entitled
to tax the goods and services of firms doing business in interstate
commerce: separate accounting, formula apportionment, and specific allocation. 14 2 In formula apportionment, the method chosen
by the tates of Vermont and Wisconsin:
Net income is considered to be derived from the States proportionately to corporate activities in the States, and the tax base is
divided accordingly. The location of employees, through a payroll
factor, and the location of tangible assets, through a property factor, are commonly used to measure the proportion of corporate
activity in a State. In addition, a sales factor is commonly used to
locate the source of monetary receipts. 4 s
Thus, a state which uses formula apportionment calculates the
taxes it is owed by multiplying its tax rate by a taxable income
which is reduced to its fair share by the application of the apportionment formula.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes
Among the questions raised by Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes was whether the State of Vermont could constitutionally
tax income through its apportionment formula from dividends
paid by subsidiary and affiliate companies to the non-domiciliary
appellant energy company. Mobil, domiciled in New York and authorized to do business in Vermont, owned many subsidiaries and
affiliates which did business entirely outside Vermont and paid the
parent Mobil dividends. 44 Following the filing of Mobil's 1970,
1971, and 1972 Vermont income tax returns, the Vermont Department of Taxes recalculated Mobil's liability for those years and as-

140. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954).
141.: 71 Am. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 143 (1973).
142. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 310 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HELLERSTEINI, (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), also
known as the Willis Committee Report).
143. Id.
144. 445 U.S. at 427-28.
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sessed a deficiency, 14 claiming that Mobil had improperly excluded the dividends from its affiliates and subsidiaries from its
14 6
reported income.
Mobil unsuccessfully challenged the deficiency assessment
before the Vermont Commissioner of Taxes.1 4 7 The company then
filed suit in Vermont state court, which reversed the Commissioner. The court held that imposing the income tax on dividends
paid by affiliates and subsidiaries discriminated against interstate
commerce because it subjected Mobil to dual taxation. 148 The Supreme Court of Vermont, however, reversed the lower court and
49
reinstated the Commissioner's assessment.1
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Vermont Supreme Court. 150 Applying the Complete Auto Transit
standard, the Court concluded that the tax did not discriminate
against interstate commerce because no duplicate taxation was
proven. 1' 1 Moreover, the Court declined to hold that only New
York, Mobil's domiciliary, could tax such dividends, suggesting
that the dividends were as much a part of Mobil's income as any
other assets and could be taxed in accordance with accepted methods of apportionment by all states in which it did business. 5 2
In effect, the Court left to Vermont's apportionment formula the
proper division of Mobil's income among the many states which
could claim the right to tax its many sources. This had the effect of
placing the burden on Mobil to prove that the apportionment
formula was unfair, a difficult and unpromising venture. 153 Moreover, the holding denied to interstate energy companies an additional forum for reducing their tax burdens by contesting whether
certain categories of income unfairly burdened interstate
54
commerce.1
145. Id. at 431-32.
146. Id. at 432.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 433.
149. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 545, 394 A.2d 1147 (1978).
150. 445 U.S. at 449.
151. Id. at 443-44. Mobil apparently pressed this issue, even though New York did not
tax the dividends in question, to establish that the commerce clause requires dividends to
be ascribed to a single situs for tax purposes, rather than apportioned among all states
where the company does business. Id.
152. Id.

153. See W.

BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES

§ 3.17 (1963).

154. Cf. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 142, at 360 (quoting Hellerstein, State Taxation of
Interstate Business: Reflections on Legislative Directions, 1967 FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FiscAL RELATIONS TAX INSTITUTE SYMPosIUM, 257 (1967)).
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The Court's approval in Mobil of state taxation of energy company dividend income accrued in other states was paralleled by its
endorsement in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue1 55 of state taxes imposed on income from levels of verticallyintegrated energy companies located in other states. Exxon filed
Wisconsin corporate income and franchise tax returns for the years
1965 through 1968 for its Wisconsin marketing operations, but did
not include income from its out-of-state exploration, pioduction,
and refining activities. " In 1971, the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue audited Exxon and notified the corporation that it had to
pay additional taxes because its reportable income included that
from all of its operations, even those not carried out in
15 7
Wisconsin.
Exxon filed an application for abatement, which was denied. The
corporation then filed a petition for review in the Wisconsin Tax
5
Appeals Commission, which was granted in part.5'
Review by a
state court resulted in yet a third formulation of Exxon's tax liability, which was more favorable to the company than the original
audit.' 59
Exxon appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, arguing that
taxation of exploration and refining operations carried on entirely
out-of-state unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.16 0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court not only affirmed that portion of
the lower court decision which upheld the tax, but reinstated the
higher tax liability calculated in the original 1971 audit.' 6
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin decision.1 62 The Court responded to the appellant's commerce clause
claim exactly as it had in Mobil, concluding that "the Commerce

155. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
156. Id. at 213.
157. Id. at 214-16. A large portion of the opinion is devoted to Exxon's assertion that its
accounting system, which separated its marketing function from the others at issue in the
case, established that the company actually constituted three businesses for purposes of the
Wisconsin tax, only one of which was located in Wisconsin for tax purposes. Id. at 211-13.
The Court concluded that the company was a single, or "unitary", business and that the
Wisconsin tax reached all of its activities. Id. at 226.
158. Id. at 215.
159. Id. at 216-17.
160. Id. at 217.
161. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 735, 281 N.W.2d 94,
113 (1979).
162. 447 U.S. at 230.
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Clause does not require that any income which a taxpayer is able
to separate through accounting methods and attribute to exploration and production of crude oil and gas be allocated to the States
in which those production centers are located."1 6 Although the
Court suggested, as it had in Mobil, that an actual showing of multiple taxation might result in a different outcome, it was unwilling
to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a tax such as that of
1 64
Wisconsin was invalid.
Taken together, these two cases show that the Court will not interpret the commerce clause as automatically restricting energyconsuming states who seek to tax income from energy-producing
companies that accrues in other states. Both the dividends from
subsidiaries and affiliates in Mobil and the revenues from separate
exploration and production activities in Exxon v. Wisconsin were
held to be subject to state taxes, even though these profits were
paid outside the borders of the taxing state in each case. Although
the Court left open the possibility that it would reexamine its position where actual multiple taxation resulted, this interpretation of
the commerce clause places a heavy burden on the energy company
which seeks to avoid taxation.
The outcome of these two cases removes a potentially lucrative
opportunity for integrated energy corporations to shelter income
from state taxation. Rather than being able to restrict taxation of
their far-flung activities to the states in which such activities take
place, enterprises will be taxable in many states, albeit only to the
extent of their proportional share of taxes resulting from application of the apportionment formula in each state. This reduces the
incentive for individual states to compete with each other to create
tax havens for the energy businesses being conducted inside their
borders.
Implications
The outcomes of these four cases are a resounding endorsement
of state power to impose taxes on energy companies. In Commonwealth Edison, Mobil, and Exxon v. Wisconsin, the state taxes
were upheld without regard to whether the taxes were being imposed by an energy-rich state taking advantage of its geological
good fortune or an energy-poor state trying to reap revenues from
163. Id. at 229-30. Indeed, the Court cites the Mobil opinion several times as controlling.
Id. at 228-29.
164. Id. at 229.
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its position as a necessary marketing outlet to the producing companies. Even in Maryland v. Louisiana, the only case in which a
state energy tax was struck down, the original plaintiffs were other
states acting in their capacity both as energy consumers and as
parens patriae for their consuming citizens.
Moreover, the commerce clause analysis used by the Court in
deciding these cases indicates great deference to state energy taxes.
The determination of whether a state tax discriminated against interstate commerce in each case was made while relying only on the
face of the tax statutes in question, and not on the actual economic
effects of the tax rates. In every case, the Court eschewed the need
for further factual inquiry into the operation of the tax law, dismissing the requests for additional information in Commonwealth
Edison 16 5 and Maryland, v. Louisiana'" as unnecessary, and in
Mobil'6 7 and Exxon v. Wisconsin"6 8 as "hypothetical". In Maryland v. Louisiana, the only case where the Court actually looked
beyond the tax being challenged, it explicitly refused to look further than the tax exemptions and credits enacted into law at the
same time and drew its conclusions entirely from the combined
statutes. 69
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that these four cases only
applied two of the four parts of the Complete Auto Transit test for
state energy taxes. Maryland v. Louisiana, Mobil, and Exxon v.
Wisconsin considered only the prohibition of discrimination
against interstate commerce, whereas Commonwealth Edison discussed both discrimination and what constituted a fair relation between a state tax and the services the state provides. None of the
cases elaborated on what established a substantial nexus between
the activity being taxed and the taxing state or on what fair apportionment of a tax entails. These requirements might result in additional restrictions on state energy taxing power in the future.
CONCLUSION

As the federal government reduces its control over the energy
industry, states that wish to increase their energy regulations and
taxes-will find a more favorable constitutional climate than in the

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

101
101
445
447
101

S.Ct. at 2959.
S.Ct. at 2136.
U.S. at 448-49.
U.S. at 229.
S.Ct. at 2134-35.
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recent past. Commerce clause restrictions that once automatically
invalidated state laws which regulated or taxed energy in interstate
commerce have been loosened. The once moribund doctrine of concurrent federal and state authority over interstate commerce announced in Cooley v. Board of Wardens has been resurrected in a
modern form.
The change in the Supreme Court's analysis of state regulation
of interstate commerce has been gradual and implicit. Neither
Kansas Natural Gas nor West has been overruled, although the
reasoning which determined their outcomes has been eroded. As a
result, state laws controlling wholesale prices of energy in interstate commerce and restricting the structures of energy companies
operating in interstate commerce, laws which once would have
been held to violate the commerce clauqe, now are more likely to
be sustained.
In contrast, the change in the Supreme Court's approach to state
taxation of energy 'in interstate commerce was sudden and direct.
Decades of conflict over the criteria for determining when state
taxes contravened the commerce clause have been made irrelevant
by the Complete Auto Transit doctrine. Four decisions in the last
two years have applied this test to establish that both energy-producing and energy-consuming states have great latitude to impose
production and income taxes on energy businesses.
With these changes has come a reaffirmance of the basic purpose
of the commerce clause to prohibit discrimination by a state in
favor of its citizens or against those of other states. The outcomes
of New England Power and Maryland v. Louisiana emphasize that
the Court will not tolerate direct geographical favoritism in either
regulatory or tax laws, even under today's easier commerce clause
restrictions. Whatever the formulation of its test for constitutionality of a state law under the commerce clause has been over the
years, the Court has rarely lost sight of its basic uniting force.

